State of New York Public Employment Relations Board Decisions from November 8, 1978 by New York State Public Employment Relations Board
Cornell University ILR School 
DigitalCommons@ILR 
Board Decisions - NYS PERB New York State Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) 
11-8-1978 
State of New York Public Employment Relations Board Decisions 
from November 8, 1978 
New York State Public Employment Relations Board 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/perbdecisions 
Thank you for downloading an article from DigitalCommons@ILR. 
Support this valuable resource today! 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the New York State Public Employment Relations Board 
(PERB) at DigitalCommons@ILR. It has been accepted for inclusion in Board Decisions - NYS PERB by an 
authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@ILR. For more information, please contact catherwood-
dig@cornell.edu. 
If you have a disability and are having trouble accessing information on this website or need materials in an 
alternate format, contact web-accessibility@cornell.edu for assistance. 
State of New York Public Employment Relations Board Decisions from November 
8, 1978 
Keywords 
NY, NYS, New York State, PERB, Public Employment Relations Board, board decisions, labor disputes, 
labor relations 
Comments 
This contract is part of a digital collection provided by the Martin P. Catherwood Library, ILR School, 
Cornell University. The information provided is for noncommercial educational use only. 
This article is available at DigitalCommons@ILR: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/perbdecisions/146 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
#2A - 11/8/78 
In the Matter of 
UNIFORMED FIRE FIGHTERS ASSOCIATION, MOUNT VERNON, 
NEW YORK, LOCAL 107, IAFF, 
Respondent
 s 
-and-
CITY OF MOUNT VERNON, 
Charging Party. 
In the Matter of 
BOARD DECISION AND 
ORDER 
Case No. U-2989 
CITY OF MOUNT VERNON, 
-and-
UNIFORMED FIRE FIGHTERS ASSOCIATION, 
NEW YORK, LOCAL 107, IAFF, 
In the Matter of 
UNIFORMED FIRE FIGHTERS ASSOCIATION, 
NEW YORK, LOCAL 107, IAFF, 
-and-
CITY OF MOUNT VERNON, 
Respondent, : 
MOUNT VERNON, : 
Charging Party. 
MOUNT VERNON, : 
Respondent, 
Charging Party. 
Case No. U-3078 
Case No. U-3106 
For Local 107, IAFF 
THOMAS P. FLYNN, Vice President 
For the City of Mount Vernon 
RAINS, POGREBIN and SCHER 
(TERENCE M. O'NEIL, 1SQ., (of Counsel) 
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This matter involves three charges. The first (Case No. U-2989), 
brought by the City of Mount Vernon, alleges that Uniformed Fire Fighters 
Association, Mount Vernon, New York, Local 107, IAFF, refused to negotiate 
in good faith for a contract to succeed one that was expiring on December 31, 
1977. The hearing officer determined that, after participating in three 
desultory negotiating sessions in which it declined to provide a sufficient 
explanation of its demands or to explain its rejection of the City's response, 
Local 107 prematurely declared the existence of an impasse on October 20, 1977. 
This, he concluded, was a violation of Local 107's duty to negotiate in good 
faith. Local 107 has filed exceptions to this conclusion. 
Case No. U-3078 was instituted by the charge of Local 107 that, after 
the impasse was declared on October 20, 1977, the City refused the assistance 
of a PERB mediator appointed to help the parties reach agreement, even though 
its fiscal year was to end seventy days later with the end of the calendar 
year. The hearing officer found merit in the charge despite his conclusion 
that Local 107 had not negotiated in good faith before requesting mediation. 
He determined that the parties were at impasse by operation of §209.1 of the 
Taylor Law, which provides that "...an impasse may be deemed to exist if the 
parties fail to achieve agreement at least one hundred twenty days prior to 
the end of the fiscal year of the public employer." 
The third case (U-3106) involves a different negotiation between the 
parties. On July 27, 1977, the City recognized Local 107 as the representative 
of. a separate unit consisting of Deputy Chiefs. In the negotiations that fol-
lowed, Local 107 presented demands for a two-year contract covering Deputy 
Chiefs that would be retroactive to January 1, 1976. When the City refused 
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to negotiate for benefits which would be retroactive to a period prior to the 
date of the recognition, Local 107 insisted upon its demand by bringing the 
matter to arbitration under §209.4 of the Taylor Law. The hearing officer 
determined that the Gity was obligated to negotiate for benefits that would 
be retroactive to the beginning of the fiscal year in which Local 107 was 
recognized, that is, to January 1, 1977, but that it was under no duty to 
negotiate for the 1976 calendar year. Both parties have filed exceptions to 
this part of the hearing officer's decision. The City argues that the hearing 
officer erred in.ruling that it was under a duty to negotiate benefits covering 
any period prior to the July 27, 1977 recognition date. Local 107 contends 
that the hearing officer should have found that Local 107 had been the 
exclusive representative of the Deputy Chiefs since August 23, 1967, on which 
date it was originally recognized as the representative of all members of the 
Fire Department, including Deputy Chiefs. 
DISCUSSION 
The record supports the hearing officer's conclusion that Local 107's 
conduct during the three negotiating sessions preceding its declaration of 
impasse did not.satisfy its obligation to negotiate in good faith. That obli-
gation requires a party to "approach the negotiating table with a sincere 
1 
desire to reach an agreement." Local 107's conduct evidenced a lack of such 
intention, as indicated by its unwillingness to explain its demands or to 
listen to the City's justifications for its counterproposals. 
1. Southampton PBA, 2 PERB 113011, at page 3274 (1969) 
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Board - U-2989/U-3078/U-3106 -4 
We agree with the hearing officer's conclusion of law that the City was 
obligated to accept the assistance of the mediator appointed by PERB, notwith-
standing Local 107's prior refusal to negotiate in good faith. The City 
asserts that, it had no obligation to participate in mediation. This would 
have been a correct position had the dispute been in the private sector, as 
Section 203(c) of the Taft-Hartley Law states explicitly: 
"The failure or refusal of either party to agree to any 
procedure suggested by the Director [of Mediation] 
shall not be deemed a violation of any duty or obliga-
tion imposed by this Act." 
We believe that the absence of a parallel provision from the Taylor Law 
reflects a contrary legislative intent with respect to the scope of the duty 
2 
to negotiate imposed by that Law. The Taylor Law was drafted on the basis of 
a report and recommendations of the Governor's Committee on Public Employee 
Relations (dated March 31, 1966). That Committee wrote (at p. 33 of its 
report): 
"Collective negotiations in government employment need 
to be closely coordinated with the calendar of the legis-
lative and budget year. Indeedji ah impasse is typically 
identified by the failure to have achieved an under-
standing or agreement before the approach of budgeting 
deadlines established by law...An impasse may be defined 
in terms of the failure to achieve agreement sixty days, 
or some longer period, prior to the budget submission date 
established by law for the agency or unit of government." 
(emphasis supplied) 
This recommendation is reflected in §209.1 of the Taylor Law, which provides 
that "an impasse may be deemed to exist if the parties fail to achieve agree-
ment at least 120 days prior to the end of the fiscal year of the public 
_2 We recognize that some other states that have imposed mediation have ex-
plicitly provided that it is unlawful to refuse to participate in mediation 
(see California Public Educational Employer-Employee Relations Act §3543.5, 
51 GERR 1418). The language of the Taylor Law and its legislative history 
persuade us that such provision, while useful for purposes of clarification, 
is not required in New York as a basis for PERB's authority to find an 
improper practice. C? Mf*r\ 5439 
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employer." Once PERB concludes that an impasse exists, §209.3 requires it to 
appoint a mediator "to assist the parties to effect a voluntary resolution of 
the dispute...." The refusal of the City to cooperate with PERB's efforts to 
effect a voluntary settlement impeded those efforts and constituted a refusal 
to negotiate in good faith. 
The use of the word "may" in §209.1 implies that this Board is not obliged 
to conclude that a true impasse exists simply by reason of the advent of the 
120-day period. There are occasions when further direct dealings between the 
parties could bring about agreement without mediation. The determination 
whether this is so in a particular case is the function of this Board's Directo 
of Conciliation. Because he cannot investigate each situation personally, his 
practice is to assign a mediator, who is also given an investigative responsi-
bility. He is instructed to investigate and report to the Director of 
Conciliation whether mediation would be useful or appropriate at that stage 
of the dispute. The City's failure to cooperate with the mediator obstructed 
his preliminary investigation and hampered the negotiation process. 
With respect to the Deputy Chiefs, we find no merit in Local 107's 
assertion that it has been the exclusive representative of the Deputy Chiefs 
A 
since August 23, 1967 by reason of having been recognized on that date. 
We determine that the hearing officer erred in concluding that the City was 
under an obligation to negotiate with Local 107 about benefits for Deputy 
3^  Originally §209.1 of the Taylor Law provided that "an impasse may be deemed 
to exist if the parties fail to achieve agreement at least sixty days prior 
to the budget submission date of the public employer." This proved unwork-
able because some public employers did not have a precise budget submission 
date and it was changed to the present language by L.1971, c.503. 
_4 Local 107 may have been recognized at an earlier time to represent Deputy 
Chiefs in the same unit as rank-and-file firefighters. If it were so recog-
nized, it had long since abandoned its right to represent Deputy Chiefs. On 
February 15, 1977, Local 107 filed a representation petition to include Deputjy 
Chiefs in its rank-and-file unit. That petition was withdrawn on July 13, 
1977, when the City and Local 107 agreed that the Local would be recognized 
to represent the Deputy Chiefs, but in a separate unit. On July 27, 1977, 
the City Council recognized Local 107 in accordance with the agreement. 
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Chiefs that would be retroactive to any period before July 27, 1977, the date 
when it was formally recognized as the representative of the unit of Deputy 
Chiefs. Section 208.1(a) of the Taylor Law extends to a recognized or certified 
employee organization the right to engage in collective negotiations on behalf 
of the employees in its negotiating unit. The reasonable meaning of this right 
is that it is acquired as a grant of authority to seek changes in terms and 
•••- - - " ± -
conditions of employment existing at the time_ of recognition or certification. 
It is thus a prospective grant directed to the establishment of a collective 
bargaining relationship between the public employer and the employee organi-
zation to be governed by their mutual obligations to deal with each other as 
to the determination of prospective terms and conditions of employment. The 
Taylor Law reflects the prospective nature of the mutual obligations assumed 
by the parties by declaring that, to the extent possible, public employers 
should be able to anticipate their future expenses when they adopt their budgets. 
We have already noted the concern of the Taylor Committee that collective nego-
tiations ought to be complete before the public employer is required to adopt 
a budget out of which the negotiated benefits will be paid. To require changes 
in terms and conditions of employment retroactively to a time before the duty 
to negotiate arose through recognition or certification would be inconsistent 
with the concept of collective bargaining and with the policy of the Law. It 
could upset the stability of terms and conditions of employment of Deputy 
Chiefs which were both established and applicable during a time when Local 107 
had no right to represent them. 
_5 The decision of the National Labor Relations Board in Tendicb, Inc., 232 NLR1 
No. 118 (1977), is of some interest. There was disagreement among the mem-
bers of the Board as to whether an employer that improperly refused to recog--
nize a union should be compelled to recognize it and bargain with it as of 
the day when it Improperly refused to recognize the union, or as of some 
later date following the decision of the administrative law judge. This 
disagreement would have no point if an employer which had not improperly 
refused to recognize a union were obligated to negotiate with the union over 
benefits covering a time before the union became the representative of the 
employees in the bargaining unit. 
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We perceive, as well, another basis for our holding. The nature of col-
lective negotiations is that the parties engage in the give-and-take of an 
exchange of considerations as a means of achieving agreement. Where, however, 
a benefit sought focuses upon a period when one of the contracting parties had 
no statutory standing to achieve it, the demand is not of a give-and-take 
nature, but rather one which would divest benefits already accrued and which 
were earned for services already performed. 
It follows that the City is not under a duty to negotiate with Local 
107 for benefits to be provided to Deputy Chiefs for services that were 
already performed before July 27, 1977, when Local 107 became the represen-
tative of the Deputy Chiefs. 
Within the constraints we have outlined, retroactivity of benefits is, 
as the hearing officer wrote, a mandatory subject of negotiation. Accord-
ingly, the City is obliged to negotiate with Local 107 for benefits for 
Deputy Chiefs that would be retroactive from the date of the agreement to 
July 27, 1977. The City has been prepared to do this, but it properly resisted 
negotiating for benefits that would be retroactive to a time when Local 107 
did not represent the Deputy Chiefs. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that Local 107 forthwith negotiate in good 
faith on behalf of the City's firefighters, 
and that it withdraw its demand for retro-
activity of benefits for Deputy Chiefs 
effective prior to July 27, 1977; and 
WE FURTHER ORDER that the City of Mount Vernon participate 
5442 
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DATED: New York, New York 
November 9, 1978 
in mediation, as required by the 
Director of Conciliation. 
- ^ t A ^ /$• /f/£= 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman: 
^u^ /OUA^<L^ 
Ida Klaus, Member 
David C. Randies, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
#2B - 11/8/78 
In the Matter of 
SCHENECTADY CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
BOARD OF EDUCATION, 
- and - Respondent. 
SCHENECTADY FEDERATION OF TEACHERS. 
LOCAL 803, AFT, AEL-CIQ, 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
CASE NO. U-2819 
Charging Party. 
THEALAN ASSOCIATES, INC. (JOSEPH T. KELLY), for 
Respondent 
FRED DAY, (Field Representative, NYSUT), for Charging 
Party 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the Schenectady City 
School District (District) to a hearing officer's decision that it had 
violated its duty to negotiate in good faith with the Schenectady Federation 
of Teachers, Local 803, AFT, AFL-CIO (Union). The hearing officer determined 
that the District failed to inform the Union that it objected to the continua-
tion of increments until after the parties had reached an impasse in their 
negotiations. The District's exceptions contend that the hearing officer 
erred in this determination. It argues that it had made clear to the Union at 
an early stage of negotiations that it sought a one-year freeze of all benefits, 
including increments. 
FACTS 
Negotiations between the Union and District commenced in January 1977 
for a contract to succeed one expiring on August 31 of that year. The parties' 
5444 
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proposals were directed to the language and substance of the existing contract, 
Article 5 of which dealt with compensation generally, and §5.1.2 of which 
dealt with salary increments. The District's posture was that all benefits 
should be frozen but its proposals did not refer specifically to §5.1.2 of the 
existing contract. The hearing officer was persuaded by the Union that it did 
not understand that the proposed freeze applied to increments until the 
1 
District explicitly statedthat it did on June 24, 1977. This occurred long 
after March 2, 1977, when an impasse in the negotiations dispute was declared. 
The hearing officer concluded that the failure of the District to make 
specific reference to §5.1.2 of the existing contract in its demands misled 
the Union through the entire course of the negotiations that preceded fact-
finding. On this conclusion, he decided that the District failed to meet its 
statutory obligation to negotiate in good faith. 
DISCUSSION 
In its exceptions, the District argues that the hearing officer viewed 
the evidence too narrowly in that he allowed himself to be persuaded by the 
absence of a specific reference to §5.1.2 in its negotiating demands. It 
contends that its demand for a one-year freeze of all benefits was sufficiently 
clear to communicate to the Union that it was objecting to further salary 
increments. Although there is testimonial evidence in the record to support 
the hearing officer's conclusion that the language of the demands misled the 
Union, we are persuaded that as a whole the record indicates that it was not 
in fact misled. In particular, we are persuaded by Paragraphs 6 and 7 of the 
1 The District's proposal did not prevent negotiations on the subject of 
a salary increment. The parties' agreement, which was reached on 
September 3, 1977, provided for increments. 
5445 
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Union's charge which read as follows: 
"6. On or about mid-February 1977, approximately four to six 
weeks subsequent to the initial exchange of packages, the 
District informed the Union that its exonomix [sic] package 
did not include increment, and that the District's position 
was to freeze ALL economic items, thereby pulling back from 
its original offer. (Emphasis in original) 
7. The District has, since mid-February 1977, not deviated 
from its position that all economic items be frozen." 
This language compels the conclusion that the Union understood the 
posture of the District at an early stage of negotiations as one covering 
increments as well as all other economic items. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the charge herein be dismissed. 
DATED: New York, New York 
November 8, 1978 
£t4j>-p**-<£!2-^siy' 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
%z«, MAMSL. 
Ida Klaus, Member 
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STATE OF NEW YOKK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
# #2C - 11/8/78 
In the Matter of : 
GREAT NECK UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT-,^  : 
: BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
Respondent, : 
-and- : CASE NO. U-3227 
GREAT NECK TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, LOCAL : 
2686, NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO, : 
Charging Party. : 
ERIC RHODES, for Respondent 
HOWARD EDELMAN, for Charging Party 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the Great Neck Teachers 
Association, Local 2686, NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO, charging party herein, :to a 
hearing officer's decision dismissing its charge that the Great Neck Union 
Free School District violated its duty to negotiate in good faith by uni-
laterally lowering the salary rate for teachers of "in-service" courses. The 
School District conceded that it lowered the salary rate for the teaching of 
in-service courses, as alleged in the charge, but it defended its actions on 
the ground that it was under no obligation to negotiate the salary rate for 
such teaching with the charging party. 
The agreement between the School District and charging party contains 
a description of the negotiating unit as including "all professional personnel 
employed in the Great Neck Schools" (emphasis supplied). The description 
then enumerates fifteen job classifications which are included in the unit. 
" 5447 
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The enumeration does not list teachers of in-service courses. 
Article 21 of the agreement establishes an "In-Service Institute" 
which is directed by an In-Service Education Advisory Committee. The nature 
of the In-Service Institute and the duties of the Committee are specified in 
detail. The details specified establish that the parties were concerned with 
the impact of the Institute on the quality of classroom teaching and upon 
salary advancements for classroom teachers. The only reference to the cost of 
the In-Service Institute is that the School District "will allocate at least 
the sum of $12,000 annually for in-service courses other than those that are 
mandated." 
Most, but not all, of the teachers of in-service courses hold regular 
teaching positions with the School District. Approximately ten percent of the 
instructors, however, do not. Appendix F to the parties' agreement contains a 
1_ • The description of the negotiating unit is set forth in Appendix A to the 
contract between the parties. In its entirety, it states: 
"For the purpose of this Agreement and as a description of the 
negotiating unit, The Great Neck Teachers Association is recognized 
as the negotiating agent for all professional personnel employed 
in the Great Neck schools, except per diem substitutes and those 
holding administrative positions or Adult Education positions. 
Members of the unit include those performing in the following job 
classifications: 
1. Classroom teachers (including special area teachers) 
2. Coordinators of Audio-Visual services 
3. Guidance counselors 
4. Heads of Department 
5. Librarians and/or Library Media Specialists 
6. Nurse-teachers 
7. School Psychologists 
8. School Social Workers 
9. Long Term Substitutes 
10. SUmmer School Teachers 
11. Teachers of the Homebound (HB) 
12. Teachers of Special Individualized Reading (S.I.R.) 
13. Teachers of English as a Second Language (T.E.S.L.) 
15. [sic] Externally Funded Teaching Personnel" 
5448 
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comprehensive extra compensation schedule which specifies the extra compensa-
tion to be paid for fifty-nine coaching assignments and forty-nine other 
activities performed by teachers. It contains no reference to the compensa-
tion of teachers of in-service courses. 
Prior to 1971, teachers of in-service courses were compensated at the 
rate of sixty dollars for each two-hour session. In that year, the In-Service 
Education Advisory Committee recommended that the salary be increased to 
eighty dollars. Without any objection or comment from the charging party, the 
School District unilaterally set the rate at sixty-nine dollars for each 
two-hour session. In 1972, the Committee recommended an increase to seventy 
dollars. Again without consultation with the charging party, the School 
District accepted this recommendation. 
The hearing officer evaluated these facts and concluded that both the 
language of the parties' agreement and past practice establish that teaching 
in the In-Service Institute is not unit work. This conclusion is challenged 
by charging party. It argues that the reference to "all professional personnel 
in the contractual description of the negotiating unit and the contractual 
establishment of the In-Service Education Advisory Committee compels reversal 
of the hearing officer's decision. We conclude that the totality of the 
evidence supports the hearing officer's decision. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the charge herein be dismissed. 
DATED: New York, New York 
November 9, 1978 
l/Q44l*eJ?-& M4< 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Ida Klaus, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
VILLAGE OF POTSDAM, 
Employer, 
-and-
NEW YORK STATE PROFESSIONAL FIRE FIGHTERS, 
IAFF, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-arid-
POTSDAM EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, CIVIL 
SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Intervenor. 
RICHARD H. WYSSLING, ESQ., Value Management 
Consultants, Inc., for Employer 
ROBERT F. GOLLNICK, for Petitioner 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the New York State 
Professional Fire Fighters, IAFF, AFL-CIO (IAFF), to a decision of the 
Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation (Director) dismissing 
its petition for certification as the exclusive negotiating representative of 
fire drivers employed by the Village of Potsdam. The Director dismissed the 
petition on the basis of his determination that the fire drivers did not con-
stitute an appropriate negotiating unit. 
Facts 
The Village of Potsdam does not employ professional ^ firefighters. 
It has a volunteer fire department of approximately 50 members. It also 
employs four persons in the Civil Service classification of "fire driver". 
At present, the four fire drivers are in a negotiating unit consisting of 
both white-collar and blue-collar employees. Their primary job responsibilities 
5450 
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are driving and attending to their vehicles.. These are reasonably comparable 
to the responsibilities of the Village's heavy and light equipment operators. 
Both are in the same negotiating unit,and they receive comparable wages. 
Aside from wages, their benefits are similar to those of other employees in 
the unit. The only other negotiating unit of employees of the Village of 
Potsdam consists of policemen. 
The Director indicates that he would have granted the petition had 
the fire drivers been firefighters, but he determined that they were not. He 
also determined that fire drivers have a sufficient community of interest with 
the other unit employees to continue in the existing negotiating unit, given 
the employer's concern that an increase in the number of negotiating units 
would impair its ability to serve the public. 
In its exceptions, IAFF points to responsibilities of fire drivers 
that are normally performed by firefighters. Fire drivers respond to fire 
alarms and they operate the motorized equipment of the fire companies. They 
may raise fire ladders, but only if the raising of the ladders can be accom-
plished by use of the truck's mechanism. They also lay hoses, but only from 
the hydrant to the truck, and not from the truck to a burning building. 
IAFF contends that the similarity of benefits received by fire drivers 
to those of other unit employees is not an indication of a community of interes 
On the contrary, it argues, this s,toilaritr.evidences a. conflict of interest ' 
in that the legitimate concerns and interests of the fire drivers have been 
sacrificed by the current majority representative which has directed its 
efforts to the service of the white and blue-collar employees who constitute 
the bulk of its unit. 
Discussion 
We affirm the decision of the Director. 
Although the evidence establishes that fire drivers perform some 
Board - CKL567 ~3 
duties that are normally performed by firefighters, they are not'"duties •• 
which justify separate units for firefighters. The unique factors in fire-
fighting that justify separate unit placement relate to the danger to which 
firefighters are exposed while fighting fires. The fire drivers employed by 
1 
the Village of Potsdam do not fight fires and are not exposed to such dangers. 
We also affirm the Director's conclusion that there is no evidence 
that the current unit representative has failed to represent the fire drivers 
fairly in negotiations or that it has overlooked their bargaining concerns. 
On the contrary, the record establishes that the fire drivers have not invoked 
the assistance of the current unit representative with respect to matters that 
are of particular concern to them. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the petition herein be, and it hereby 
is, dismissed. 
DATED: New York, New York 
November 8, 1978 
-y^k^-e^A-
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
.rt^fek.^  x^^u^s^-
Ida Klaus, Member 
David C. Ranoies,yKember 
JL The evidence is inconclusive, but the fire drivers may have occasionally 
extinguished automobile and leaf fires before the volunteer firefighters 
arrived. Assuming arguendo, that they have, those fires are not normally 
of the dangerous character which makes firefighting a unique occupation. 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
THE YONKERS PUBLIC LIBRARY 
Upon the Application for Designation of 
Persons as Managerial or Confidential. 
#2E - 11/8/78 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
CASE NO. E-0444 
KENNETH J. FINGER, P.C., for the Association 
DR. PHILIP HARRIS, for the Library 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the Yonkers Public Library 
Staff Association (Association) to a decision of the Acting Director of 
Public Employment Practices and Representation (Director) that Adelaide Wenz, 
Anna Butkowski and Ruth Hesslon are confidential employees of the Yonkers Public 
1 
Library (Library). 
Facts 
The Library, one of the largest in the State, has five branches, an 
annual budget of approximately $1.8 million, and a staff of approximately one 
hundred full-time and fifty part-time employees. The Director of the Library 
is Jacqueline Miller. She is its chief executive officer and reports only to 
the Board of Trustees. She is responsible for formulating policy and making 
recommendations to the Trustees. She participates in collective negotiations 
on behalf of the Library. Her associate in representing the Library in collec 
tive negotiations is Irene Rogers, the Assistant Director of the Library. 
Ms. Rogers compiles data for the Library's bargaining proposals, represents 
the Library in the Third and Fourth steps of the contractual grievance pro-
cedure, and has a significant responsibility for personnel administration. 
Neither Miller nor Rogers has ever been formally designated as a managerial 
employee, but it is clear that their job responsibilities satisfy the definitioi 
1 Section 201.7 states, in pertinent part: "Employees may be designated as 
confidential only if they are persons who assist and act in a confidential 
capacity to managerial employees...." 
Board - E-0444 -2 
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of managerial employees contained in the Taylor Law. 
The Association is the duly recognized representative of the employees 
of the Library. Wenz, Butkowski and Hession have been in the negotiating unit 
represented by the Association and they wish to continue to be represented by 
the Association. 
Wenz is Miller's personal secretary. She types all of Miller's 
memoranda and correspondence, including matters" related to collective" hegdtia-~"~ 
tions. Work related to such negotiations involves only five percent of her 
time, but the nature of her duties makes her privy to confidential labor 
relations matters. 
Butkowski serves as Rogers' secretary. She, too, works on materials 
that are related to collective negotiations, although the amount of time she 
spends on such work is even less than the time so spent by Wenz. 
Hession is the chief fiscal analyst of the Library. She reports 
directly to Miller. She makes personnel and budget projections. She also 
determines the cost of salary and benefit proposals made during collective 
negotiations and analyzes their impact upon the Library. Hession attends both 
open and Executive meetings of the Board of Trustees at which the status of 
collective negotiations is discussed. 
In its exceptions, the Association argues that the amount of time 
spent by Wenz and Butkowski on matters related to collective negotiations is 
de minimis and, therefore, not sufficient basis for them to be designated 
confidential employees. It further argues that Butkowski could not be a confi-
1_ A managerial employee is one "... .(i) who formulate[s] policy or (ii) 
who may reasonably be required on behalf of the public employer to 
assist directly in the preparation for and conduct of collective nego-
tiations or to have a major role in the administration of agreements 
or in personnel administration provided that such role is not of a 
routine or clerical nature and requires the exercise of independent 
judgment." (Section 201.7[a]) 
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dential employee within the meaning of the statute because she works for 
Rogers, and Rogers has never been formally designated as a managerial employee. 
With respect to Hession, it argues that the "costing out" of negotiations 
proposals is merely technical work which does not expose her to confidential 
information. It further argues that she has no actual function at the Execu-
tive meetings of the Board of Trustees and, therefore, her attendance at those 
meetings cannot be a basis for designating her as a confidential employee. 
It claims some support for this proposition in a determination of the Director 
that was never brought to this Board in New York City Board of Education, 
9 PERB [^4020 (1976). There the Director determined that an employee who some-
times sat in on grievance committee meetings did not become confidential for 
that reason because—as the employer in that case conceded—his presence at 
those meetings was not necessary. 
The Association contends that the Director erred in distinguishing 
Butkowski from several other clerical employees who worked in the same room 
as she did because they all had access to files that were related to nego-
tiations. 
DISCUSSION 
We affirm the decision of the Director. While it is true that neither 
Wenz nor Butkowski spent much time on materials related to collective negotia-
tions, this is because the Library generated only a small amount of clerical 
work of this type. Such clerical work of this type as it does generate is 
nevertheless confidential. It has to be done by some clerical employees 
and this responsibility falls upon Wenz and Butkowski. The fact that other 
clerical employees have access to files containing information related to 
collective negotiations does not detract from the confidential nature of 
the positions of Wenz and Butkowski. 
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Hession, too, is a confidential employee. Unlike the New York City 
Board of Education case where the employer did not require the employee's 
attendance at confidential meetings, here, the Library requires Hession's 
attendance at such meetings. We do not reach any conclusion as to the value 
to the Library of her attendance at Executive sessions of the Board of Trustees 
at which the status of collective negotiations is discussed. It is sufficient 
that we find no basis in the record for a conclusion that her attendance has 
been required merely for the purpose of depriving her of a right to be 
represented by the Association. 
In a Library which employs approximately one hundred full-time and 
fifty part-time employees, we find that the three employees here may be 
reasonably required to assist the two managerial employees and to act in a 
confidential capacity to them in connection with the preparation for and 
conduct of collective negotiations. 
ACCORDINGLY, WE ORDER that Adelaide Wenz, Anna Butkowski and 
Ruth Hession be designated confidential 
employees. 
DATED: New York, New York 
November 8, 1978 
HQs^#-Cd2 A. /Itf^r-pt'---**-^, Z-
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
4^ M \*44~<&* 
Ida Klaus, Member 
&$<£. 
David C. Randies, Member 
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Charging Party. 
WILLIAM A. BACAS, ESQ., for Respondent 
PETER B. O'CONNELL, ESQ., for Charging Party 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of Robert A. Armstrong 
to a hearing officer's decision dismissing his charge that the Superintendent 
of Highways of the Town of Lake Luzerne first threatened him and then dis-
charged him because of his involvement in union organizational activities. 
Armstrong contests the hearing officer's conclusion that he was discharged for 
political and personal reasons which were not related to his efforts to estab-
lish a union in the Highway Department of the Town. He also complains that 
the hearing officer erred in disregarding evidence that establishes that at the 
time he was discharged he was attempting to organize his fellow employees in 
order to seek additional vacation pay. Finally, he argues that, even if the 
reason for his discharge was the Highway Superintendent's disapproval of his 
political activities, that discharge constituted an improper practice because 
those political activities were protected by the Taylor Law. He argues that 
the Taylor Law protects the right of public employees to support the political 
rivals of their employers where they believe that by doing so they can improve 
their terms and conditions of employment. 
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We affirm the decision of the hearing officer. There may be some 
circumstantial evidence supporting Armstrong's allegation that the purpose of 
the Highway Superintendent in discharging him may have been to frustrate the 
organization of Highway Department employees. Among other things, the Highway 
Superintendent first tried to.persuade the hearing officer that he discharged 
Armstrong because of Armstrong's misconduct in connection with the ordering of 
tools. Armstrong argues that the Superihtehderit attempted to explain his dis-'"" 
charge on the basis of his political activities only when it became clear that 
the hearing officer was not persuaded by the original explanation., According 
to Armstrong, the pretextual character of the first explanation indicates that 
the second explanation, too, was a pretext, the real reason being his attempt 
1 
to organize employees. 
The hearing officer was persuaded by testimonial evidence that the 
Superintendent was indifferent to whether or not Highway Department employees 
organized a union. In part, this conclusion was reached on the basis of the 
hearing officer's assessment of the credibility of the various witnesses. 
Having reviewed the record carefully, we do not find sufficient reason to re-
verse the hearing officer's conclusion. 
It follows from his conclusion that the Superintendent, did not 
intend to frustrate the organization of a union of Highway Department employees 
that the hearing officer committed no prejudicial error by not commenting upon 
evidence that may have established that, prior to his discharge, Armstrong was 
attempting to organize his fellow employees in order to seek additional vacatior 
1 We do not find it surprising that the Superintendent was reluctant to explair 
the discharge on the basis of Armstrong's political activities. Such a dis-
charge may raise questions under the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the 
U.S. Constitution, even though it would not raise any question under the 
Taylor Law, Elrod v. Burns, 427 US 347 (1976). 
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pay. Such activities, if any, do not, in and of themselves^ establish an im-
2 
proper practice. 
The argument that the Taylor Law protects political activities, as 
3 
such, of public employees is rejected. The political right of public em-
ployees to support one candidate or another raises questions under the First 
_4 
and Fourteenth. Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, but it is not in and of 
itself an inherent aspect of the right of public employees to organize or to 
be represented by employee organizations. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the charge herein be, and it hereby 
is, dismissed. 
DATED, New York, New York 
November 9, 1978 
4Wf7te~*&^ 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
okas fc%usu^ 
Ida Klaus, Member 
M^&^S^JA 
David C. Randies, Member 
Section 209-a.l of the Taylor Law provides, in pertinent part: 
"...It shall be an improper practice for a public employer 
or its agents deliberately (a) to interfere with, restrain 
or coerce public employees in the exercise of their rights 
guaranteed in section two hundred two for the purpose of 
depriving them of such rights;...(c) to discriminate against 
any employee for the purpose of encouraging or discouraging 
membership in, or participation in the activities of, any 
employee organization;" (emphasis supplied) 
See Laurence and VanPelt, 1 PERB 1(399.91 (1968). 
Elrod v. Burns, supra. 
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Officers Benevolent Association of Nassau County 
ISRAELSON, MANNING & RAAB, ESQS., (PERRY S. HEIDECKER, 
ESQ., of Counsel) for Petitioner, Suffolk County 
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ROEMER & FEATHERS TONHAUGH, ESQS. (STEPHEN WILEY, ESQ., 
of Counsel) for Interveners 
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This is a decision in two consolidated cases, both of which present a 
single question: on the special facts here present, what is the appropriate 
month during which a rival employee organization may file a petition to replace 
an incumbent employee organization as representative of employees in the Unifiec 
Court System? The answer to that question depends upon whether the status of 
the incumbent organization is related to the fiscal year of the State of New 
York or to that of the counties that are serviced by the courts for which the 
non-judicial employees work. 
Facts 
For years, responsibility for court employees had been split between 
the Administrative Board of the Judicial Conference, a State agency, and the 
counties serviced by the courts. The counties had a substantial responsibility 
for funding the operations of the courts, including the salaries of non-
judicial court employees, which was considered sufficient for it to be deemed 
the employer of those employees for Taylor Law purposes. Often, pursuant to 
the parties' agreement, these employees were in negotiating units which includ-
ed other county employees. All of this was changed by Chapter 966 of the 
Laws of 1976, which transferred financial responsibility for the courts from 
the counties to the State and declared the State to be the employer of all 
court employees, effective as of April 1, 1977 (Judicial Law §220.6). 
Case No. C-1668 involves a challenge to the status of the Nassau Chap-
ter of the Civil Service Employees Association (CSEA) as representative of non-
judicial employees of courts that had been funded by Nassau County. CSEA and 
Nassau County are parties to a collectively negotiated agreement covering non-
judicial court employees which runs from January 1, 1977 through December 31, 
1978, the end of the county's fiscal year. The challenging petition was filed 
by the Court Officers Benevolent Association of Nassau County on May 4, 1978. 
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Case No. C-1672 involves a challenge to the status of the Civil Service 
Employees Association (CSEA) as representative of non-judicial employees of 
courts that had been funded by Suffolk County. CSEA and Suffolk County are 
also parties to a collectively negotiated agreement covering non-judicial 
employees which runs from January 1, 1977 through December 31, 1978, the end 
of the county's fiscal year. The challenging petition was filed by the 
Suffolk County Court Employees Association, Local 716, SEIU, AFL-CIO, on May 
31, 1978. The fiscal year of the State of New York runs from April 1 of one 
calendar year through March 31 of the following calendar year. 
The petitions were timely if the relevant fiscal year is that of the 
counties, but not if it is that of the State. Section 208.2 of the Taylor Law 
provides that a recognized or certified employee organization: 
"...shall be entitled to unchallenged representation 
status until seven months prior to the expiration of 
a written agreement between the public employer and 
said employee organization determining terms and con-
ditions of employment. For the purposes of this sub-
division, (a) any such agreement for a term covering 
other than the fiscal year of the public employer shall 
be deemed to expire with the fiscal year ending 
immediately prior to the termination date of such 
agreement,...." 
The Rules of this Board (§201.3) permit a petition to be filed during the month 
preceding the expiration of the period of unchallenged representation. Thus, 
if the fiscal year of the counties is the relevant one for purposes of contract 
bar, CSEA's period of unchallenged representation expired on May 31, 1978 and 
challenges filed during May 1978 were timely. However, if the fiscal year of 
the State is the relevant one for purposes of contract bar, the agreement would 
be deemed to have expired on March 31, 1978, and CSEA's unchallenged represen-
tation status would have expired on August 31, 1977. Therefore, a petition 
would have had to be filed during the month of August 1977. Thereafter, it 
would be subject to a subsequent bar. 
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The Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation concluded 
that CSEA's unchallenged representation status is determined by the fiscal 
year of the counties because it is they, and not the State, who negotiated 
the agreements and because they were the employers at the beginning of the 
contract periods. CSEA has filed exceptions to his decision. It contends 
that the relevant fiscal year is that of the State because it is the employer 
which must negotiate a successor agreement. 
Discussion 
There is some logic to support the CSEA contention. The reason that the 
Taylor Law authorizes a challenge seven months before the end of a public 
employer's fiscal year is to permit the resolution of representation disputes 
early enough so that the public employer and the certified employee organi-
zation can complete negotiations for a successor agreement before the public 
1 
employer must adopt a new budget. Here, the successor agreements must be nego-
tiated by the State. 
Notwithstanding the appeal of this argument, we find the arguments for 
relating a petitioning challenge to the fiscal year of the counties more per-
suasive. The policy underlying the Taylor Law is the promotion of harmonious 
relationships between governments and their employees. An essential ingredient 
of such relationships is stability. Stability, however, must be balanced 
against the right of public employees to change representatives at appropriate 
times. The language of Chapter 966 of the Laws of 1976 indicates that the 
Legislature was particularly concerned with maintaining terms and conditions of 
employment of court employees and the structure of their negotiations as they 
1 See the Report of the Governor's Committee on Public Employee Relations, 
March 31, 1966, pages 32 and 33. 
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existed at that time. Judicial Law §220.6(a) provides that, notwithstanding 
the change of employers, "terms and conditions of employment shall continue in 
effect until altered by state law or by the terms of a successor contract." 
Subdivision 7 of that section even restricts changes in negotiating units of 
court employees. The terms and conditions of employment have not been altered 
by state law. 
Despite these indications that the Legislature intended to maintain the 
status quo ante regarding the terms and conditions of employment of court 
employees during the period following the State's assumption of responsibility, 
we are asked by CSEA to interpret the law as intending to disrupt the existing 
labor relationship by shortening the period of unchallenged representation by 
nine months. We do not find such an interpretation consistent with the intent 
of the Legislature, as manifested by the language of the applicable statute. 
Moreover, in this unusual situation where a government with one fiscal year 
becomes the successor public employer to a government with a different fiscal 
year, it is more reasonable to interpret §208.2 of the Taylor Law as applying 
to the fiscal year of that government which was the public employer when the 
agreement became effective. We believe that Judicial Law §220.6(a) was intended 
to be construed in this way. 
ACCORDINGLY, WE DISMISS the exceptions of CSEA, and 
WE AFFIRM the determinations and orders of the Director in 
both cases. 
DATED:. New York, New York 
November 9, 1978 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Ida Klaus, Member 
